Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.
Crowdfunding platforms enable members of the public to make small investments in ventures pitched by entrepreneurs (Agrawal et al, 2013) . In the United States, equity crowdfunding was legalized in April 2012 when President Obama signed into law the JOBS Act (Stemler, 2013) : this permits investors to take small shareholdings in new startups. Research on crowdfunding is beginning to emerge, though it mostly focuses on donation-based funding (Burtsch et al, 2013; Mollick, 2014) .
Several studies show that accumulated capital invested in projects serves as an informative but noisy signal of project quality (Agrawal et al, 2011; Burtsch et al, 2013) and a higher proportion of bad projects in the pool can paradoxically increase the number of good projects that end up funded. These findings may be of practical interest to entrepreneurs, investors, and crowdfunding platforms.
The Model
There are n investors, where n is a positive, finite integer. I assume that n is unknown, which seems realistic given the geographically dispersed, online setting of crowdfunding (Agrawal et al, 2011) . n is taken to be large enough that each individual investor regards themselves as atomistic, i.e. they do not make investment decisions in order to influence investors who invest after them (Bikhchandani et al, 1992) . As in Welch (1992) , resource scarcity is modeled by having all investors (who arrive in a random sequence) commit exactly one dollar to one and only one project of their choosing. The crowdfunding platform presents an integer number m projects to choose from: all of these available projects start and end at the same time. Of these projects, an integer number l (where l < m) are classed as `good'; the identities of good projects are unknown to investors.
If they receive funding, a good project yields a positive rate of return; the remaining m − l projects are `bad', yielding a lower (possibly negative) rate of return. Consistent with the design of most crowdfunding platforms, there is a 'provision point mechanism', whereby projects are only funded if a publicly-declared funding threshold is reached within the funding window, n. Since all investors invest one dollar, the threshold can be parameterized as the need for k investors to invest in a project, where k is treated as exogenous. 1 If projects are not funded, investors get just their stake back, i.e. a zero rate of return.
A proportion θ (where 0 < θ < 1) of investors are `informed', receiving an informative signal about one of the l good projects. A signal correctly identifies a project as good with probability ζ (where 0 < ζ <1). For the signal to be useful, > . The remaining proportion 1− θ of investors is uninformed, receiving no signal. Although θ and ζ are public knowledge, receipt of a signal is private information. Consistent with the design of most crowdfunding sites, however, everyone can observe the cumulative amounts invested in each project. The owners of projects know the type of their project but cannot signal this credibly to investors, leading to a pooling equilibrium. To avoid a trivial problem in which all projects can be funded, assume km > n.
Turning to investment decisions, it is always optimal for an uninformed investor to invest in the project with the greatest amount of investment so far, since that project is associated with the greatest expected number of positive, informed signals. An informed investor is also interested in the expected number of such signals, but they also have private information. Suppose they get a signal about project j, which has attracted dollars so far. The investor wants to know the probability that there were signals out of the possible signals that could have been received, where ∈ 0,1, … , . Letting denote the number of signals,
Of course, this is just the density function of the binomial distribution, whose expected value is ! , = Hence, counting the informed investor's signal, the expected number of signals for project j is 1 + .
Index the non-j project with the greatest dollar investment so far by i, where i ≠ j. By the above reasoning, the expected number of good signals for project i is # . Hence an informed investor should use their private information to invest in j as long as
If this inequality is reversed, an informed investor should disregard their private information and choose the project with the greatest number of investments: at this juncture they behave like an uninformed investor. An 'information cascade' starts at the point that (1) holds with equality. As previous work has shown, cascades can form for both good and bad projects; and they can be suboptimal, leading to funding of bad projects instead of good ones (Bikhchandani et al, 1992) . Investors use the decision rules established in the previous section; when they face more than one equally good option (e.g. as the first investor does if she is uninformed), a random tie-breaker is utilized. For any given Ψ, complete investment sequences are repeated 10,000 times to average 2 Note that: (i) the decision rule above does not depend on ζ because all signals are assumed equally accurate; (ii) θ was assumed known: greater complexity would arise if investors estimated θ with heterogeneous prior beliefs; and (iii) n was assumed unknown: the decision rule (1) would have to be modified were n known. Generalizing the model by relaxing these assumptions is a task left to future research. 3 It might seem that n = 30 is too small to permit individuals to regard themselves as 'atomistic', as assumed in the model. But as shown below, k and n can be scaled up together without affecting the qualitative results.
over different random investor arrivals, tie breaks, etc. The institutional set-up and investment decisions described in the previous section are coded into an APL program (available on request). 
Conclusion
This simulation exercise has shown that information cascades can mitigate the problem whereby private information leads investors to spread resources so thinly that few good projects achieve the funding they require. Uninformed investors are the most active promoters of cascades, which can explain why, paradoxically, their presence can sometimes improve the functioning of crowdfunding markets. Similar reasoning applies to the existence of 'bad' projects: although information cascades can result in some of these gaining funding, a pool dominated by too many good projects can again lead to investments in them being spread too thinly. A practical implication is that equity crowdfunding platforms might encounter diminishing returns to any efforts designed to improve the quality of participating projects and investors.
Of course, too many bad projects likely incur resource costs: future research is needed to estimate the balance between good and bad projects and how crowdfunding platforms can strike an optimal balance between them.
